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Some extensions of neoclassical growth models are discussed that allow for cross section
heterogeneity among economies and evolution in rates of technological progress over time.
The models o¤er a spectrum of transitional behavior among economies that includes con-
vergence to a common steady state path as well as various forms of transitional divergence
and convergence. Mechanisms for modeling such transitions and measuring them econo-
metrically are developed in the paper. A new regression test of convergence is proposed,
its asymptotic properties are derived and some simulations of its nite sample properties
are reported. Transition curves for individual economies and subgroups of economies are
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data and Penn World Table data.
Keywords: Economic growth, Growth convergence, Heterogeneity, Neoclassical growth,
Relative transition, Transition curve, Transitional divergence.
JEL Classication Numbers: 030; 040; C33.
First Completed Draft: January 2005
Phillips gratefully acknowledges research support from a Kelly Fellowship at the Business School, University
of Auckland, and the NSF under Grant No. SES 04-142254.
1
The legacy of economic growth that we have inherited from the industrial revo-
lution is an irreversible gain to humanity, of a magnitude that is still unknown....The
legacy of inequality, the concomitant of this gain, is a historical transient. Lucas
(2002, pp.174-175).
1 Introduction
In his study of the growth of nations in the world economy over the last 250 years, Lucas
(2002) argues that the enormous income inequality across countries that followed in the swath
of the industrial revolution has now peaked. Instead, in the twenty rst century, as countries
increasingly participate in the economic benets of industrialization, this income inequality will
prove to be a historical transient. Building on a model of Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990),
Lucas develops a theory that seeks to explain the transition that has occured in the world
economy from the stagnant steady state economies that persisted until around 1800 to modern
economies that experience sustained income growth. Human capital accumulation is posited
as the engine of this growth and the mechanism by which it is accomplished comes by way
of a demographic transition that emerges from the inclusion of fertility decision making into
the theory of growth. These arguments involve two forms of transition: a primary economic
transition involving the move toward sustained economic growth and a secondary, facilitating
demographic transition associated with declining fertility. These arguments are supported
by some descriptive data analysis that document the transitions and suggest the emergent
transience in income inequality mentioned in the headnote quotation.
The present paper looks at the phenomenon of economic transition from an economet-
ric perspective. We ask two main questions and then proceed to develop an econometric
methodology for studying issues of economic transition empirically. The rst question concerns
neoclassical economic growth and asks if the model has the capacity to generate transitional
heterogeneity of economic growth patterns across countries that are consistent with historical
income inequality while still allowing for some form of ultimate growth convergence. Such be-
havior would have to accommodate transient divergence in growth patterns. So, a subsidiary
question relates to the conditions under which such transitional economic divergence could
occur and how it might be parameterized and evaluated empirically.
In seeking to address the rst question, we start by considering the impact of cross sectional
and temporal heterogeneity on the speed of (beta) convergence in a traditional growth conver-
gence setting such as that considered in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). In such a setting, the
transition dynamics of log per capita real income yit in country i at time t has the following
simple form
log yit = ai + bie
 t + xt; (1)
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where  represents the speed of convergence and may be taken to be a function of the
growth rate of technological progress x; amongst other factors. The denition of techno-
logical progress can, of course, be rather broad and may include social, political, cultural,
scientic, engineering and economic factors. The rst term, ai; in (1) incorporates initial con-
ditions and steady state levels. In this model, under homogeneity of  and x, neoclassical
theory does not naturally accommodate such enormous di¤erences in observed income growth
as the world economy has witnessed in the success of the Asian Dragons or the growth dis-
asters of Sub Saharan Africa in relation to other developing countries. However, when we
permit cross sectional and temporal heterogeneity in these parameters (leading to it and xit),
neoclassical growth can provide for such forms of transitional cross sectional divergence. With
these extensions, the model may also allow for ultimate growth convergence, thereby making
the cross country income inequality transient, as argued by Lucas.
The speed of convergence parameter it may reasonably be regarded as an increasing func-
tion of technological progress xit: Accordingly, poor economies with a low level of technological
accumulation may begin with a low it and a correspondingly slow speed of convergence: As
such countries learn faster (e.g., from improvements in education and the di¤usion of technol-
ogy), their xit rises and may exceed the rate of technological creation in rich nations. So, it
rises and the speed of convergence of these economies begins to accelerate. Conversely, if a poor
country responds slowly to the di¤usion of technology by learning slowly or through su¤ering
a major economic disaster which inhibits its capacity to adopt new technology, its speed of
convergence is correspondingly slower in relation to other countries (including rich countries),
thereby producing the phenomenon of transitionally divergent behavior in relation to other
countries. In other words, heterogeneous neoclassical economic growth may accommodate a
family of potential growth paths in which some divergence may be manifest. If over time the
speed of learning in the divergent economies becomes faster than the speed of technology cre-
ation in convergent rich economies, there is recovery and catch-up. In this event, the inequality
that was initially generated by the divergence becomes transient, and ultimate convergence in
world economic growth can be achieved.
Transitional economic behavior of the type described in the last paragraph leads to an-
other major question: what variables govern the behavior of xit and inuence its transitional
heterogeneity. While this question is not addressed in the present paper, it is hoped that the
methods developed here for studying empirical economic transitions in growth performance will
be relevant in addressing similar issues regarding the transition behavior of the many factors
that inuence economic growth.
To accommodate the time series and cross sectional heterogeneity of technological progress
in growth empirics, this paper proposes a new econometric approach based on the analysis of
an economys transition path in conjuction with its growth performance. The transition path
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can be measured by considering the relative share of per capita log real income of country i in
total income, or hit = log yit= log yt; where log yt denotes the cross section average of log per
capita real income in the panel or a suitable subgroup of the panel1. Under certain regularity
conditions on the growth paths, the quantity hit eliminates the common growth components (at
least to the rst order), and provides a measure of each individual countrys share in common
growth and technological progress. Moreover, since hit is time dependent, it describes how this
share evolves over time, thereby providing a measure of economic transition. In e¤ect, hit is
a time dependent parameter that traces out a transition curve for economy i; indicating that
economys share of total income in period t.
If there is a common source of sustained economic growth t, then with the di¤usion of
technology and learning across countries, learning through formal education, and on the job
learning (Lucas, 2002), we may reasonably suppose that all countries ultimately come to share
(to a greater or lesser extent) in this growth experience. In this context, the parameter hit
captures individual economic transitions as individual countries experience this phenomenon to
varying extents. As with the Galton fallacy, we do not expect all countries to converge. There
will always be an empirical distribution of growth and per capita income among nations, as
indeed there is between individuals within a country. However, there can still be convergence
in the sense of an elimination of divergent behavior (as even the poorest countries begin to
catch up) and an ultimate narrowing of the di¤erences. Transitional growth empirics of the
type considered in this paper seek to map these di¤erences over time in an orderly manner
that provides information about the transition behavior of countries in a world economy as
they evolve toward a limit distribution in which all countries share in the common component
in economic growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies some of the issues that arise in al-
lowing for heterogeneity in neoclassical growth models and examines links between temporal
heterogeneity in the speed of convergence and transitional divergence. Section 3 derives some
stylized facts concerning long term growth patterns across countries based on average real
per capita income for 18 Western OECD countries over the past 500 years. This section also
considers the e¤ects of technological adaptation and learning on the time forms of economic
transition. Section 4 formalizes the concept of an economys transition curve, which reveals
the extent to which an individual economy shares at each point in time in the common growth
component of a group of economies. Section 5 develops an econometric formulation of this
concept, which provides the time prole of transition for one economy relative to a group av-
erage. This relative transition curve is identied and can be tted using various smoothing
methods, which we discuss. The tted transition curves can be used to reveal evidence on
1The idea of measuring transitions by means of a transition parameter was rst suggested in the working
paper Phillips and Sul (2003).
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central issues such as growth convergence and the possibility of transient divergent behavior.
A regression test is developed to conduct formal econometric tests of this behavior. Empirical
applications of these methods are reported in Section 6, where we study regional transitions
in the US, national economic performance in the OECD nations, and growth and transitional
divergence in the world economy using the Penn World Tables (PWT). Some conclusions and
prospects for further research are given in Section 7. Further technical material, asymptotic
justications, and information on the data are given in the Appendices.
2 Heterogeneous Progress of Technology and Growth
We start from the neoclassical theory of growth convergence and attempt to build some con-
nections between the theoretical formulations and observed empirical regularities. Write the
production function in the neoclassical theory of growth with labor augmented technological
progress as Y = F (K;LHA) and dene
~y = f(~k); ~y = Y=LHA; ~k = K=LHA; y = ~yHA = ~yA (2)
where Y is total output, L is the quantity of labor input, H is the stock of human capital, A
is the state of technology, K is physical capital, and ~y is output per e¤ective labor unit. In the
last part of (2), H is normalized to unity so that technology A is dened broadly to encompass
the e¤ects of human capital.




where the growth rate of technology is common across countries. The latter condition is
obviously restrictive and presumes that all economies experience technological improvements
at the same rate xit = x over time, while operating from di¤erent initial levels (Ai0). A more
plausible assumption is that the technology growth rates xit di¤er across countries and over
time but may possibly converge to the same rate x as t!1: In such a case, the evolution of Ait
is inevitably more complex than (3), thereby accommodating a wider range of possible growth
behavior. This motivation underlies the framework for empirical analysis that we develop later
in this paper.
Let us assume that technology is a public good, is widely available and is represented at
time t by a common technology variable Ct whose time prole follows
Ct = C0e
t: (4)
For developed countries, the full extent of common technology Ct is taken to be instantly
accessible. Indeed, it may be presumed that these countries created Ct and are materially
5
Figure 1: A Taxonomy of World Economic Growth over 1960-1996. The arrowed
distances measure   convergence and show little evidence supporting this form of the conver-
gence hypothesis. The thickness of the shadowed areas can be used to assess  convergence.
There is apparently some evidence of  convergence between the rich and richest country
groupings. Taking all the country groupings together, the entire path has a similar form to
the time path of average OECD income over the historical time frame of 500 years shown in
Fig. 3. Details of the country groupings used in the gure are given in the Appendix.
6
involved in determining its future time path. Followers, like the developing nations, generally
have to learn earlier technology rst and develop an infrastructure to absorb and utilize it.
As a result, it may be assumed that such countires cannot fully share in the present level of
Ct. Depending on the speed of learning in these countries and the time form of their exposure
to the common technology, the actual technological progress of developing countries is likely
to di¤er across i over time. To model such cross section and temporal heterogeneity, we may
treat Ct as a factor of production which di¤erent countries share in at their own idiosyncratic




xitt = A (xit; t; Ai0) ; say. (5)
The technological growth rate of economy i is now xit + t _xit and is time dependent. This for-
mulation means that technological learning di¤ers across countries and over time even though
there is a common underlying technology. These di¤erences among economies allow for phe-
nomena such as technological catch-up and slow-down, which are known to be important in
empirical work.
Using this framework and a Cobb-Douglas technology in (2), the transitional growth path
for country i is shown in Phillips and Sul (2005) to be
log yit = log ~y

i + [log ~yi0   log ~yi ] e itt + logAit; (6)
which is an extension of (1), where yi is per capita real income, ~yi is the corresponding steady










In this formulation, i denotes the technology parameter in the Cobb-Douglas function, i is
the rate of depreciation and vi is the population growth rate. Appropriate sign e¤ects are
indicated beneath these parameters in (7).
The term involving e itt in (6) decays as t!1 provided the condition
itt!1 (8)
holds, in which case the path of log per capita real income is primarily dependent on the term
xitt and may therefore be substantially a¤ected by heterogeneity in technology progress over




(log yit+k   log yjt+k) = 0: (9)
2For the time being, all variables are taken to be non-stochastic, so a simple limiting operation is used in (9)
in place of the limit of a conditional expectation as in Bernard and Durlauf (1996).
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Thus, growth convergence requires that log per capita real income be the same across countries
in the long run. A necessary condition for (9) in a model with heterogeneous transitional
technology like (5) is
xit+k ! x; for all i as k !1: (10)
Even when there is ultimate growth convergence of the type implied by (10), transient diver-
gence in growth patterns may still occur for instance, when an initially poor country adopts
technology more slowly than rich countries create new technology. During this period the
speed of learning in the poor economy is slower than the speed of technological creation in the
rich economy and transitional divergence may occur. Subsequently, as xit rises and the speed
of learning picks up, the poor economy may begin to catch up with the richer economies.
3 Empirical Regularities and Economic Transition
We now proceed to develop some stylized empirical regularities concerning long term growth
patterns across economies and use these to demonstrate the practical import of temporal and
cross section heterogeneity in the progress of technology. We look at two separate bodies of
evidence dealing with world and OECD economic growth and provide some graphical analysis
of hypothetical transition e¤ects, relating these to the actual growth paths of certain regional
groupings of world economies.
First, studies by Durlauf and Quah (1999), Easterly (2001), Sun (2001) and others have
recently raised doubts about the empirical evidence for growth convergence across the world
economies. In place of convergence, there is evidence of emerging convergence clubs. In
particular, the richest countries appear to be growing more slowly than some of the newly
developed countries, such as the Asian Dragons and some other rapidly growing developing
countries like China, whereas the remaining world economies appear to be growing at similar
rates or slower rates than the rich countries. These ongoing di¤erences in growth rates make
the idea of convergence clubs and emerging multi-modality in the world distribution of income
appealing.
Fig. 1 provides a new way of looking at some of the evidence on convergence and growth.
This gure shows ve groupings of cross sectional averages of log per capita real income for
88 countries from the PWT over 1960 to 1996 ( a data set that has frequently been used in
empirical work).
The subgroupings are based on initial income and the number of countries in each of the
rst four groups is 17 while the richest group number 20 countries. The time paths of the
subgroup averages are shown over the ve successive panels in the gure. Each panel covers
the same 37 year period. While each panel restarts the time prole from 1960 onwards, the
arrangement of the panels produces an escalator e¤ect from the poorest to the richest groups
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Figure 2: Cross sectional average of log per capita real income for 18 Western OECD countries
over 500 years.
that is surprisingly connected in form. The escalator begins with a stair that has a fairly at
shape corresponding to the slow growth of the poorest nations and the stairs generally become
steeper as the nation groups become richer and grow faster.
The content of Fig. 1 also provides summary evidence on growth convergence over 1960-
1996. First, the heights of the shadowed areas in the gure measure total economic growth
between 1960 and 1996 for the average in each country group and therefore provide information
about - convergence, according to which initially poor countries will grow faster than initially
rich countries enabling the poor countries to catch up. Evidence on the heights of the shadowed
areas in the gure does not seem to give any general support to - convergence. While the rich
countries do appear to be catching up with the richestnations, the rest of world economies
appear not to be growing fast enough to catch up with either the richor the richestcountries.
The so-called -convergence does not seem to have much empirical support either. The heights
of the two arrows in the gure indicate cross sectional income disparity in 1960 and 1996,
respectively. Evidently, using this criterion, cross sectional income dispersion in the world
seems to be widening rather than narrowing, at least over this time frame. Thus, Fig. 1s
broad visual evidence on world economic growth and its disparities appears to be consonant
with the conclusions reached by Durlauf and Quah (1999) and others in the articles cited
9
Figure 3: Anatomy of Historical OECD Growth over 1870-2001. The curve shows the
e¤ects of two actual (rich country and poor country 1) and two hypothetical (poor countries 1
and 2) learning rates for technological progress.
above.
Notwithstanding this evidence, we may still address the question whether cross section
economic divergence is a transient phenomenon. Transitional divergence in economic growth
may ocur when there is temporal heterogeneity of technology progress. That is, when xit
evolves over time. As is clear from Fig. 1, the heights of the shadowed areas which measure
economic growth over a 37 year time span for each group average are positively correlated
with the level of initial income in the group. Moreover, the ordering of total economic growth
within the rst four groups (i.e. all groups except the richest) over 1960-1996 matches exactly
the ordering of initial income in the group. If such a pattern of growth were to persist over the
next 37 years, then the lower income groups (i.e., the poorest, poor, and middlegroups)
may grow faster than they have over the last 37 years (as they transition to a higher category),
whereas the richcountries may not grow faster as they transition into the richestcategory
(just as the richest group have grown on average slower than the rich group over 1960-
1996). If this process were to continue, then eventually per capita real income across the world
economies would narrow and recent evidence of cross sectional heterogeneity would then be
viewed as transitional. This reasoning appears to support the observation made by Lucas
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(2002) in the headnote of this article about the transience of income inequality. But much
remains uncertain in this calculation, including the transitioning between groups and the time
frame of the transitions.
As a second body of evidence, we take the cross section average of log per capita real
incomes for 18 OECD countries from 1500 to 2001 and plot the data3 against time in Fig. 2.
Between 1500 and 1800, economic growth was very slow compared to the subsequent periods
of the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century and the scientic revolution over the
twentieth century. It is intriguing that this new gure which is based on 500 years of data
bears more than a passing resemblance to Fig. 1 which is based on only 37 years of data but
involves a much wider distribution of world economies. This resemblance suggests that there
may be information in the long historical economic performance of (now advanced) OECD
countries that is manifest in the world income distribution in recent decades.
We o¤er one possible answer to this question by considering the pattern of average OECD
growth over the last two centuries more closely. We will use the observed historical pattern to
suggest some hypothetical examples that shed light on possible forms of transitional economic
performance. The examples are based on modifying the actual historical pattern to produce
hypothetical economies with di¤ering rates of technological progress. We may focus on (tem-
poral and cross section) heterogeneity in xit because model (6) itself suggests that for long
historical series the term involving the exponential decay factor e itt may be neglected and
the growth path may be regarded as being principally determined by technological progress
xit through the term logAit:
To proceed, we consider Fig. 3, which plots the cross section average of log yit across
18 OECD countries4 over 132 years between 1870 and 2001 after eliminating business cycle
components. This time prole of historical OECD growth is used to explain how transitory
divergence in economic growth patterns can occur. Suppose that we observe two groups of
economies (rich and poor) between time q and T +q where T = 66:We split the cross sectional
average of log yit into two parts. The rst part starts in q = 1870 (which we now use to represent
the poor group) while the second part starts from q = 1936 (which we use to represent the rich
group). We denote the speed of technological learning or creation by S: Our normalization is
that if S = 1 then either the rich or the poor country takes T = 66 years to complete the given
growth path which is based on the historical OECD record. The initial incomes for the two
groups are approximately $2,000 and $4,000 dollars, respectively. The rich group is assumed
to grow along the given growth path shown in Fig. 3. Now consider three hypothetical poor
countries in the poor group, two of which will involve time dilation e¤ects to capture di¤ering
rates of technological progress. Poor country 1 (which is based on actual OECD performance)
takes 66 years to complete the growth path shown, so that this countrys speed of learning is
3The Data Appendix provides details of the data and data sources.
4See the Data Appendix for details of the countries included.
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Figure 4: Transition, Catch up and Divergence relative to the Speed of Learning.
The curves show the e¤ects of the di¤ering technological learning speeds (taken from Fig. 3)
on growth performance, replacing time dilation by accelerated technological learning.
also just S = 1. Poor countries 2 and 3 are assumed to learn faster than poor country 1 and
their speeds of learning are approximately 1:5 and 1:8, respectively, which are obtained by time
dilation. Hence, poor country 3 grows further than both poor country 2 and poor country 1
because of its higher rate of technological progress. Both countries 2 and 3 will eventually catch
up to the rich group in a nite period of time because they experience accelerated learning
and growth.
Fig. 4 re-draws the hypothetical growth paths of these countries against the same time
horizon with no time dilation. The e¤ects of a learning speed S > 1 are now assumed to be
transmitted by way of a faster rate of technological progress. Evidently, poor country 1 seems
to diverge since this countrys speed of learning does not exceed the speed of technological
creation of the rich group. Poor country 2 also seems to diverge initially from the rich group
and yet begins to catch up towards the end of the period. Poor country 3, on the other hand,
appears to converge to the rich group. While poor countries 2 and 3 are hypothetical and are
constructed using time dilation e¤ects, all countries are based on the actual OECD record and
poor country 1 is the actual record over chronological time with no temporal distortion.
This simple hypothetical example shows the importance of heterogeneity in the progress of
technology on economic performance. Since we have removed business cycle e¤ects and worked
with average OECD income, the resulting curves are smooth, but they indicate a variety of
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possible forms of transitional behavior that include both convergence and apparent divergence.
Actual patterns of transition, including transitionally divergent behavior, will inevitably be
more complicated than that shown in Figs. 3 and 4. Our econometric objective, taken up
in Section 6 below, is to learn about actual transitional behavior by estimating individual
patterns of transition.
Table 1: Economic Performance and Speed of Learning based
on Long Run historical OECD Growth
y1950 y2001 Base Trajectory Base Trajectory Speed of
Year of yG;1950 Year of yG;2001 Learning
18 OECD 5,150 20,110 1950 2001 1.00
Africa 949 1,796 1727 1860 2.61
Middle East 1,737 5,808 1858 1950 1.80
Asian Dragons 1,533 18,289 1849 1995 2.86
East Asian 620 1,454 before 1500 1847 > 6.80
NIEs 1,072 4,952 1802 1942 2.75
India 619 1,957 before 1500 1866 > 8.18
China 438 3,583 before 1500 1917 > 7.18
Carribean 1,801 4,674 1861 1940 1.55
Japan 1,920 20,683 1920 2001 1.59
Latin American 3,673 6,947 1919 1957 0.75
Next we proceed to relate these hypothetical transition curves to the actual growth paths of
certain regional groupings of the world economies. We start by supposing that Fig. 2 provides
a model for world economic growth in the sense that the actual economic performance of the
18 Western OECD countries over the historical time frame 1500-2001 is a base trajectory for
economic evolution that other countries in the world follow, albeit over di¤erent time frames,
thereby allowing for di¤ering speeds of technological learning across countries. Accordingly,
we seek to estimate where other countries lie on the long run base OECD trajectory and to
calculate the approximate speed of learning within those countries that is necessary to have
achieved their given economic performance.
For many countries, data on annual per capita real income is available only from around
1950, so it is convenient to use the period 1950-2001 to represent recent trends in world
economic growth. The OECD historical data base provides estimates of per capita income
over the long historical period 1500-2001 but not for all 18 constituent OECD countries and
not on an annual basis prior to 1870. Therefore, to obtain a complete base trajectory series for
OECD trend growth, we inlled observations over the 1500-1870 using a combination of linear
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interpolation and coordinate trend tting, as proposed in Phillips (2004)5. Next, we formed 9
geographical subgroups from 88 countries in the world economy and used the cross sectional
average of their log per capita income to approximate their common growth component. Using
this data, we matched the initial and last period incomes of the 9 subgroups in 1950 and 2001,
respectively, with the base OECD trajectory and estimated the corresponding speed of learning
for each subgroup (G).
Table 1 reports the results. Base OECD trajectory income in 1950 was $5,150 and takes 52
years to reach $20,110 in 2001. Columns 4 and 5 of the table show the base OECD trajectory
year corresponding to the observed income levels yG;1950 and yG;2001 for each country grouping
G: For example, the average initial and nal period incomes for the African countries group
in 1950 and 2001 were $949 and $1,796 (columns 2 and 3). These gures correspond to base
OECD trajectory income in years 1727 and 1860, respectively. We deduce from this calculation
that the speed of learning for the African group is approximately 2.61 (column 6). Thus, the
African countries can be said to be undergoing growth comparable to that of the OECD base
group over 133 years during the industrial revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
but the growth experience of these countries is actually compressed into a 52 year time frame
during the twentieth century. In an analogous way, initial year 1950 income and nal period
2001 income for the Asian Dragons are $1,533 and $18,289, respectively, which places this group
on the base OECD trajectory over the period from 1849 to 1995. The Asian Dragons have
therefore experienced in 52 years economic growth that is comparable to that of 146 years of
growth for the OECD base group up to 1995. The learning speed of the Asian Dragons is 2.86
and is therefore faster than that of the African group. Moreover, the Asian Dragon experience
co-relates to a much more recent period of the base OECD trajectory. Similarly, Japans speed
of technology learning is 1.59 and this implies that it has compressed the last 81 years of base
trajectory OECD growth up to 2001 into 52 years.
The table also reveals that the fastest learning countries are China, India and the East
Asian group. Remarkably, China has experienced over four centuries of base trajectory OECD
growth in the last 52 years taking it to year 1917 levels on the OECD trajectory. India and the
East Asian group of countries have experienced more than three and a half centuries of base
trajectory growth in 52 years, taking them to mid-nineteenth century OECD levels of income.
5From the historical OECD series described in the Data Appendix, there is century data over 1500-1820.
From 1820 onwards, there is annual data for four OECD countries and from 1870 onwards there is annual data
for 18 countries. The gaps in these series are interpolated, rst by a linear interpolation and subsequently by a
smoothing inll lter based on a tted coordinate trend (Phillips, 2004).
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4 Economic Transition Curves
We start by developing some econometric formulations of the neoclassical model that allow for
heterogeneity in the speed of convergence and transition e¤ects over time. It is helpful in this
development to use some general specication of the trending mechanism. It is su¢ cient for our
purpose that there be some underlying trend mechanism, which may have both deterministic
and stochastic components, and that this trend mechanism be a common element (for instance
arising from knowledge, technology and industry in developed countries) in which individual
economies can share. We denote this common trend element by t: The extent to which
economies do share in the common trend depends on their individual characteristics and will
be manifest in their growth performance and the phenomenon of transition.
From (5) and (6), the transition path of log per capita real income can be written as follows
log yit = log ~y

i + logAi0 + [log ~yi0   log ~y] e itt + xitt = ait + xitt; (11)
where
ait = log ~y

i + logAi0 + [log ~yi0   log ~y] e itt: (12)
Under (8), (12) is a decay model for ait which captures the evolution ait ! log ~yi + logAi0 as
t ! 1: Correspondingly for large t, log yit eventually follows a long run path determined by
the term xitt in (11).
Following the discussion in Section 2, the growth path xitt is presumed to have some
elements (and sources) that are common across economies. We use t to represent this common
growth component and can think of t as being dependent on a common technology variable
like Ct in (5), which enters as a factor of production for each individual economy. According
to this view, all economies share to a greater or lesser extent in certain elements that promote
growth, for instance, the industrial and scientic revolutions.






t = bitt; (13)
where bit measures the share of the common trend t that economy i experiences. In general,
the coe¢ cient bit measures the transition path of an economy to the common steady state
growth path determined by t: During transition, bit depends on the speed of convergence
parameter it; the growth rate of technical progress parameter xit and the initial technical
endowment and steady state levels through the parameter ait:
For example, in a neoclassical growth framework, steady state common growth for log yit
may be represented in terms of a simple linear deterministic trend t = t: Such a formulation
is explicit in (4), for example. Then, according to (13), bit = xit + aitt and, further, under the
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growth convergence conditions (8) and (10) we have the convergence bit ! x as t!1: When
the economies have heterogeneous technology and xit converges to xi; we have
bit = xit +
ait
t
! xi; as t!1; (14)
so that xi determines the growth rate of economy i in the steady state.
Figure 5: Possible Transition Paths for Yi (r) = bi (r) (r)
In more general models and in empirical applications, the common growth component
t may be expected to have both deterministic and stochastic elements, such as a unit root
stochastic trend with drift. In the latter example, t is still dominated by a linear trend
asymptotically and conditions like (14) then hold as limits in probability. While this case
covers most practical applications, we may sometimes want to allow for formulations of the
common growth path t that di¤er from a linear trend even asymptotically. Furthermore,
a general specication allows for the possibility that some economies may diverge from the
growth path t; while others may converge to it. These extensions involve some technical
complications that can be accommodated by allowing the functions to be regularly varying at
innity (that is, they behave asymptotically like power functions). We also allow for individual
country standardizations for log per capita income, so that expansion rates may di¤er, as well
as imposing a common standardization for t: Appendix A provides some mathematical details
of how these extensions and standardizations can be accomplished.
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In brief, we proceed as follows. Our purpose is to standardize log yit in (13) so that the
standardized quantity approaches a limit function that embodies both the common growth
component and the transition path. To do so, it is convenient to assume that there is a suitable
overall normalization of log yit for which we may write equation (13) in the standardized form
given by (15) below. Suppose the standardization factor is diT = T iWi (T ) ; for some i > 0
and some slowly varying function6 Wi (T ) ; so that log yit grows for large t according to the
power law ti up to the e¤ect of Wi (t) and stochastic uctuations. We may similarly suppose
that the common trend component t grows according to t
Z (t) for some  > 0 and where Z
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as shown in Appendix A.
Now suppose that t = [Tr] ; the integer part of Tr; so that r is e¤ectively the fraction of the














 biT (r)T (r) : (17)
In (17), T (r) is the sample growth curve, biT (r) is the sample transition path (given T
observations) for economy i at time T: It is further convenient to assume that these functions
converge in some sense to certain limit functions as T ! 1: For instance, the requirement
that biT and T satisfy
T (r)!p  (r) ; biT (r)!p bi (r) ; uniformly in r 2 [0; 1] ; (18)
where the limit functions  (r) and bi (r) are continuous or, at least, piecewise continuous,
seems fairly weak. By extending the probability space in which the functions biT and T
6That is Wi (xT ) =Wi (T ) ! 1 as T ! 1 for all x > 0: For example. the constant function, log (T ), and
1= log (T ) are all slowly varying functions.
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are dened, (18) also includes cases where the functions may converge to limiting stochastic
processes7. The limit functions  (r) and bi (r) represent the common steady state growth
curve and limiting transition curve for economy i; respectively. Further discussion, examples
and some general conditions under which the formulations (17) and (18) apply are given in
Appendix A.
Combining (17) and (18), we have the following limiting behavior for the standardized
version of log per capita income for economy i
1
diT
log yi[Tr] !p Yi (r) = bi (r) (r) : (19)
With this limiting decomposition, we may think about  (r) as the limiting form of the common
growth path and bi (r) as the limiting representation of the transition path of economy i as this
economy moves towards the growth path  (r) : The representation (19) is su¢ ciently general
to allow for cases where economies approach the common growth path in a monotonic way
either from below or above  (r) ; just as economies 2 and 3 in the stylized paths shown in Fig.
5, or in a much more indirect manner where there may be periods of transitional divergence,
as shown in the path of economy 1 in Fig. 5.
To illustrate (19), when t is a stochastic trend with positive drift, we have the simple









for some constant g > 0: If bit satises (14); then the limit function bi (r) = bi = xi is a constant
function of r. Combining the two factors gives the limiting path Yi (r) = bigr for economy
i; so that the long run growth paths are linear and parallel across economies. When there is
convergence across economies, we have limit transition curves bi (r) each with the property
that bi (1) = b; for some constant b > 0; but which may di¤er for intermediate values (i.e.,
bi (r) 6= bj (r) for some and possibly all r < 1): In this case, each economy may transition in
its own way towards a common limiting growth path given by the linear function Y (r) = bgr.
In this way, the framework permits a family of potential transitions to a common steady state.
Fig. 5 illustrates some possible transition paths for Yi (r) of this type. Paths 2 and 3 in the
gure show monotonic convergence to the common growth path  (r) ; whereas path 1 involves
transient divergence of Y1 (r) from  (r) with subsequent catch up and convergence. In this
case, the more complex approach to the common growth path is reected in the transition
curve b1 (r) for this economy.
7For example, if t is a unit root process, then under quite general conditions we have the weak convergence
T 1=2[Tr] = T (r) ) B (r) to a limit Brownian motion B (e.g., Phillips and Solo, 1992). After a suitable
change in the probability space, we may write this convergence in probability, just as in (18).
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5 Relative Transition and Convergence
5.1 Some Stylized Models and Asymptotics





























which describes the relative transition of economy i against the benchmark of a full cross
sectional average. Other benchmarks are possible (including subgroup averages or even a single
advanced economy like the USA) and these will be considered below and in our empirical work.
Clearly, hiT depends on N also but we omit the subscript for simplicity because this quantity












; as T !1; (21)
and the function hi (r) then represents the limiting form of the relative transition curve for
economy i:
The curve hi (r) shows the time prole of transition for economy i relative to the average.
At the same time, hi (r) measures economy is relative departure from the common steady
state growth path  (r) : Thus, any divergences from  (r) are reected in the transition hi (r) :
While many paths are possible, a case of particular interest and empirical importance occurs
when an economy slips behind in the growth tables and diverges from others in the group.
We may then use the transition curve to measure the extent of the divergent behavior and to
assess whether or not the divergence is transient.
When there is common (limiting) transition behavior across economies, we have hi (r) =
h (r) across i; and when there is ultimate growth convergence we have
hi (1) = 1; for all i: (22)
This framework of growth convergence admits a family of relative transitions, where the curves
hi (r) may di¤er across i for r < 1; while allowing for ultimate convergence when (22) holds.
Removing the common (steady state) trend function  (r) that appears in Fig. 5, Fig. 6 shows
the corresponding relative transition curves, each satisfying the growth convergence condition
(22).
While the criterion for the ultimate convergence of economy i to the steady state is given by
(22), the manner of economic transition and convergence can be very di¤erent across economies.
Fig 6 shows three di¤erent stylized paths. Economies 2 and 3 have quite di¤erent initializations
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Figure 6: Relative Transition Curves hi (r) and Phases of Transition
and their transitions also di¤er. While both relative transition parameters converge monotoni-
cally to unity, path 3 involves transition from a high initial state, typical of an already advanced
industrial economy, whereas path 2 involves transition from a low initial state that is typical
of a newly industrialized and fast growing economy. Economy 1, on the other hand, has the
same initialization as 2 but its relative transition involves an initial phase of divergence from
the group, followed by a catch up period, and later convergence. Such a transition is typical of
a developing country that grows slowly in an initial phase (transition phase A), begins to turn
its economic performance around (phase B) and then catches up and converges (phase C).
The framework in (21) is compatible with a situation where there is an innite population.
In this event, as N passes to innity, if a law of large numbers applies to the transition functions
bi; so that N 1
PN
j=1 bj ! b; we would dene hi (r) = bi (r) =b (r) : Convergence for economy
i would then apply if bi (1) = b (1), leading to the same criterion as that given in (22) above.
In this extension, some economies may converge (when bi (1) = b (1) for some i) while others
remain outliers and do not converge to the average (when bj (1) 6= b (1) for some j). In such
situations, there is per capita income inequality in the limit distribution (or full population of
economies), yet still the possibility of convergence to the mean for some economies, much as
in Galtons (1886, 1889) work on regression to mediocrityin human physical characteristics
like height. So, this form of growth path convergence is analogous to Galtons empirical nding
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that the deviation of childrens heights from the mean regresses toward zero over time (relative
to their parentsheights), while the overall distribution of heights in the population does not
necessarily narrow over time. Correspondingly, there is some advantage in not insisting on a
requirement of the form that in the full population
R
(h  1)2 dPh = 0; where h = h (1) and Ph
is the limit measure of h (r) ; a requirement that would correspond to Galtons fallacy (Quah,
1993, and Hart, 1995).
On the other hand, in the case of economic growth, we might reasonably ask whether there
is a narrowing in dispersion over time, for example by comparing the variation of h at points











dPh for r > s:
Alternatively, we could ask whether for some subgroup of NG economies G there is convergence
in the sense that we have
hGiT !p 1 for i 2 G; (23)













is the relative transition curve for economy i in group G:
A regression test of convergence in the transition function hGiT is developed later in this
section. When the time series sample T is large, we have the prospect of estimating the relative
transition curve hi (r) for each individual economy and testing the convergence criterion (22);
possibly for subgroups of economies like G as indicated above or against the benchmark of
a single economy like the US. For short time series with small T; transitions are generally
still occuring because of temporal heterogeneity in the key parameters it and xit, and it is
therefore di¢ cult and less meaningful to test for growth convergence. Even in such cases,
however, the tted transition curve may still reveal interesting empirical properties of the
individual economies in transition.
Also, as Figs. 5 and 6 illustrate in a stylized way, when there is temporal and cross
section heterogeneity, there exists an innite number of possible transition paths even in cases
where there is ultimate convergence. Moreover, as discussed earlier, there are good reasons for
thinking that there will be income inequality across economies even in the limit distribution
as T !1: Appendix E provides some discussion of these issues in the context of models with
heterogeneous stochastic trends with drift.
5.2 Fitting Transition Curves
There are several possible approaches to tting transition curves. In its most general form the
problem has two nonparametric elements, involving the unknown transition function bi (r) and
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the growth curve  (r) : Without further assumptions it is not possible to separately identify
these two functions. However, as shown above, many of the important elements are embodied
in the relative transition function hi (r) : So one of the primary goals of the econometric analysis
is to estimate the limiting form of the transition function, hi (r) ; which may then be used for
various purposes, including an analysis of convergence. In practical work, the time series will
often be short and the task therefore presents some di¢ culties.
Of course, the quantity log yit= 1N
PN
i=1 log yit can be calculated directly from observations of
log per capita real income. But it will often be preferable to remove business cycle components
from the data rst as interest centres on the long run component. Extending (13) to incorporate
a business cycle e¤ect it; we can write
log yit = bitt + it:
Smoothing methods o¤er a convenient mechanism for separating out the cycle it; and we can
employ ltering, smoothing and regression methods to achieve this. In our empirical work,
we have used two methods to extract the trend component bitt. The rst is the Whittaker-
Hodrick-Prescott (WHP) smoothing lter8. The procedure is exible, requires only the input
of a smoothing parameter, and does not require prior specication of the nature of the common
trend t in log yit: The method is also suitable when the time series are short. In addition to the
WHP lter, we employed a coordinate trend ltering method (Phillips, 2004). This is a series
method of trend extraction that uses regression methods on orthonormal trend components to
extract an unknown trend function. Again, the method does not rely on a specic form of t
and is applicable whether the trend is stochastic or deterministic.
The empirical results reported below were little changed by the use of di¤erent smoothing
techniques. The coordinate trend method has the advantage that it produces smooth function
estimates and standard errors can be calculated for the tted trend component. Kernel meth-
ods, rather than orthonormal series regressions, provide another general approach to smooth
trend extraction and would also give standard error estimates. Kernel methods were not used
in our practical work here because some of the time series we use are very short and comprise
as few as 30 time series observations. Moreover, kernel method asymptotics for estimating
stochastic processes are still largely unexplored and there is no general asymptotic theory to
which we may appeal, although some specic results for Markov models have been obtained
in work by Phillips and Park (1998) and Guerre(2004).
8Whittaker (1923) rst suggested this penalized method of smoothing or graduatingdata and there has
been a large subsequent literature on smoothing methods of this type (e.g. see Kitagawa and Gersch, 1996). The
approach has been used regularly in empirical work in time series macroeconomics since Hodrick and Prescott
(1982/1997).
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are obtained by taking ratios to cross-
sectional averages. Assuming a common standardization9 diT = dT for simplicity and setting
t = [Tr] we then have the estimate ĥi (r) = ĥi[Tr] of the limiting transition curve hi (r) in (21).
We can decompose the trend estimate f̂it as







where eit is the error in the lter estimate of fit: Since t is the common trend component, the


















































= hi (r) ;
so that the relative transition curve is consistently estimated by ĥi (r).
5.3 Testing Divergence
We may use the tted transition curves ĥi (r) to reveal evidence on key issues such as possible
transitional divergence for some individual economies and the ultimate convergence of others.
Under the growth convergence criterion (22) we have ĥi (1)!p 1 for such convergent economies.













9Alternatively, if the standardizations diT were known (or estimated) and were incorporated directly into






would correspondingly build in the individual standardization





as given in (20).
10Primitive conditions under which eit
t
!p 0 holds will depend on the properties of t and the selection of
the bandwidth/smoothing parameter/regression number in the implementation of the lter. In the case of the
WHP lter, this turns on the choice of the smoothing parameter () in the lter and its asymptotic behavior
as the sample size increases. For instance, if t is dominated by a linear drift and !1 su¢ ciently quickly as
T ! 1; then the WHP lter will consistently estimate the trend e¤ect. Phillips and Jin (2002) provide some
asymptotic theory for the WHP lter under various assumptions about  and the trend function.
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(ĥj (1)  1)2 !p 0; as T !1; (27)
which provides a mechanism for studying convergence characteristics of subgroups of economies.
Under more specic conditions that are discussed in Appendix B, we may assess the evi-










for t = [Tr] for some r > 0; we have the regression equation
logHGt = logA  2 log t+ uGt ; (29)
whose error uGt is shown in the Appendix to be asymptotically equivalent to a zero mean,
weakly dependent time series whose explicit expression in terms of model components is given
in (51).
Equation (29) is a logarithmic regression corresponding to a decay model for the sample
variance of the relative transition that has the explicit parametric form HGt  A=t2 in the
limit as t!1: In this formulation, the parameter  governs the rate at which the cross section
variation over the transitions decays to zero over time. Appendix B investigates some stochastic
models for which the transitions are of this type and for which the log tregression equation
(29) may be derived with an error of op (1) for large T andNG: Conditions under which (29) may
be validly tted by least squares regression and appropriate procedures for the construction of
standard errors and regression tests in this model are also discussed in this Appendix. Least
squares regression on (29) is shown to produce
p
TNG consistent estimates of the parameter ;
autocorrelation robust standard errors may be calculated using conventional procedures and
formula (62) based on the limit theory for the regression coe¢ cient and econometric tests of
hypotheses about  may be implemented from this regression.
The form of (29) suggests a simple regression test of the hypothesis of convergence. When
 > 0; logHGt and hence H
G
t decreases with t and (27) is satised in the limit as t ! 1:
Conversely, when  = 0; HGt does not converge to zero and so there is no convergence in the
subgroup G. More specically, we may test H0 :  = 0 against the alternative H1 :  > 0 in
a least squares regression of (29) using observations t = [Tr] ; [Tr] + 1; :::; T for some r > 0:
The regression may employ either hGit computed directly from log yit as in (28) or, as discussed
above, use the ltered data ĥGit based on the tted values \log yit from a coordinate trend
regression or smoothing lter. The growth convergence hypothesis (27) corresponds to the
alternative H1: So, rejecting H0 provides empirical evidence in favor of convergence among the
economies in subgroup G and the value of  is a measure of the rate of convergence. Further
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details of the construction of this test and its asymptotic properties under the null and local
alternatives are provided in Appendix B. The test is consistent and has non trivial power in






: The use of this test is illustated in the simulations
and the empirical applications that follow.
5.4 Transitioning between Subgroups and Subsample Convergence Testing
Suppose there are N economies overall in the cross section and that these economies are divided
into G subgroups, each of sizeNG; so thatN = GNG: Fig. 1 illustrates such a collection of G = 5
subgroups of national economies ordered according to income and traces the evolution of these
subgroups over the period 1960-1996. The historical experience shown in Fig. 1 indicates that
there is some transitioning over time between these economic subgroups in which the upper
members of one subgroup can catch up with a higher subgroup. To consider such transitioning
we develop the following subsample version of the log t test.
Suppose that the G subgroups are ordered from the richest to the poorest groups accord-
ing to income. If the speed of technological creation and learning is di¤erent across these
subgroups, some transitional divergence can be expected between the richest and some of the
other subgroups as indicated in the stylized paths of Fig. 5 and the empirical time forms
shown in Fig. 1. On the other hand, when the speed of technological creation and learning
is comparable across subgroups, we would not expect to see transitional divergence of this
type. To nd empirical evidence of these e¤ects, we may cross-fertilize the original groups
by dropping the rst ` richest countries from the top subgroup and forming G   1 new sub-
groups based on income ordering in the same way with each group having the same number of
economies, NG; as before. By repeating this exercise, we e¤ectively subsample the full-group
and thereby obtain evidence on linkage performance over time among the original subgroups.
This information sheds light on whether there is transitional divergence or catching up between
groups of countries. More specically, the new subgroups overlap the joints in the original
subgroups and provide a natural way of focusing attention on transitioning between subgroups.
In particular, performing a log t test on the new subgroups provides a direct test of whether
one group of economies is catching up to the next group.
Subsampling along these lines also helps to reduce size distortion (that is, a tendency to
reject the null H0 of divergence even when there is no convergence) in the log t test that shows
up in simulations of the nite sample performance of this test. The reason for this improvement
is that subsampling raises the hurdle for rejecting the null hypothesis and rejection ofH0 occurs
only when the evidence is convincing across the various subgroups that there is convergence.
More details of the way the procedure is implemented is provided in Appendix D. As in other
subsampling procedures, we have to choose the number ` that determines how many economies
to discard in reforming the subgroups. In simulations, we have found ` = NG=2 to work well.
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6 Empirical Illustrations of Transition
As suggested in the stylized examples considered earlier, diverse patterns of economic transition
are possible when we allow for cross sectional and time series heterogeneity in the parameters
of a neoclassical growth model. This potential for diversity in transition is illustrated in the
following empirical examples involving regional and national economic growth. Similar panel
data sets to those used here have been analyzed in the growth convergence literature in the
past, but our application focuses attention on the phenomenon of economic transition as part
of the larger empirical story about convergence and divergence issues. We start by providing
some graphical illustrations of the various phases of transition in the empirical data and then
proceed to conduct some formal statistical tests using log t regressions.
6.1 Transitional Divergence: Graphical Illustrations
The rst illustration is based on regional economic growth among the 48 contiguous U.S.
states11. In this example, there is reasonable prior support for a common rate of technological
progress and ultimate growth convergence but we may well expect appreciable heterogeneity
across states in the transition paths. Fig. 7 displays the relative transition parameters cal-
culated for log per capita income in the 48 states over the period from 1929 to 1998 after
eliminating business cycle components. Evidently, there is heterogeneity across states, but
also a marked reduction in dispersion of the transition curves over this period together with
some clear evidence that the relative transition curves narrow towards unity, as indicated in
the convergence criterion (22).
Fig. 8 shows the cross-sectional average of the tted transition curves over 9 separate
geographical regions for the contiguous U.S. States data. The shapes of these regional transition
curves are similar to those for the full 48 States shown in Fig. 7, but in the new gure it is easier
to distinguish the regional transition patterns. The Mid-Atlantic, New England and Pacic
regions start the period above average and transition in a downward direction, whereas the
South Altantic, West South Central and East South Central start the period below average
and transition upwards. The time prole of these cross sectional averages shows that the
transition curves have been steadily converging toward unity over the last 70 years, as indicated
in criterion (22). Interestingly, the regional convergence does not seem to be completed yet
and there is remaining regional inequality, although there is also evidence of some subgroup
convergence of the form (23).
The second illustration involves a panel of real per capita income for 18 OECD countries
taken from the OECD historical data set. Fig. 9 displays the relative transition parameters for
log per capita income in these 18 OECD countries between 1929 and 2001. The countries were
11The data source for U.S. state per capita real income is the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Figure 7: Transition Paths for the 48 Contiguous US States.
Figure 8: Transition Paths for Regional Groups of the Contiguous US States
27
Figure 9: OECD Transition Paths: 18 Western OECD countries from 1929-2001
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Figure 10: Evidence of Phase B & C Transitions in Historical OECD Data
selected on the basis of data availability and are listed in the Data Appendix. The observed
time proles of transition for these OECD nations are quite di¤erent from those of Fig. 7, even
though the time frame is similar. For the OECD nations, the relative transition parameters
initially seem to display no coherent pattern and, in some cases, even to diverge before World
War II. After around 1950, however, the pattern of transition seems similar to that of Fig.
7. Over the latter part of the period, there is a noticeable narrowing in the transition curves
towards unity, indicating a clear tendency to converge towards the end of the period.
Fig. 10 shows the relative transition parameters for certain subgroups of countries against
the benchmark of the U.S. . We have created ve economic subgroups in this exercise. Except
for the former U.K. colonies, all subgroups show clear evidence of some transitional divergence
with a turn-around by the end of WWII. After that, all of these subgroups reveal a strong ten-
dency towards convergence with the U.S.. Evidently, Fig. 10 provides an empirical illustration
of the stylized patterns of economic performance characterized as phases B and C of Fig. 6.
Extending the panel back to 1870 and through to 1930, Fig. 11 shows transition curves that
are similar in form to phase A (transitional divergence) in the stylized patterns of Fig. 6, with
evidence of the phase B turn-around coming towards the end of the period.
The nal illustration is based on log per capita income in 88 PWT countries in the world
economy over the period 1960 to 1996. The country selection is mainly based on data avail-
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Figure 11: Evidence of Phase A and B Transitions in Historical OECD Data
Figure 12: Examples of Phase B Transitions among the World Economies
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Figure 13: Examples of Phase C Transitions among the World Economies
Figure 14: Examples of Phase A Transitions among the World Economies
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ability. Given the large number of countries and the wide variation in the data, it is helpful
to take subgroup averages to reduce the number of transition curves, which we show against
the benchmark of the 18 OECD countries. The subgroups are based on total population and
geographical region. Phase A transitions are found in two of these subgroups the countries
of Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Latin American & Carribean economies (Fig. 14). Phase B
transitions occur in three subgroups India, China and the Eastern Asian countries (Fig. 12).
Finally, phase C transitions are evident in two subgroups the Asian dragons and the newly
industrialized economies (NIEs) shown in Fig. 13. From these ndings about the present
standing of these economic groups and assuming that the world economies are in transition to
ultimate convergence on a path that is related to long run historical OECD growth, then we
can expect that China, India and the Eastern Asian countries will continue to grow faster over
the next decade than the OECD nations as they move into phase C transition; and, soon or
later, we can expect to witness the Sub-Saharan and Latin American countries entering phase
B transition where they begin to turn around economic performance and start to catch up
with the 18 OECD countries. However, from the evidence to date in these gures, we cannot
yet distinguish, especially for the Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin American countries, whether
or when such changes will occur. We now provide a formal statistical test of this issue.
6.2 Testing Growth Convergence
We perform the log t regression test based on (29) with three panel data sets the 48 contiguous
United States, 18 OECD countries and 88 PWT countries. The results are shown in Table
4. With the full-group test, we reject the null of no convergence among the 48 contiguous
United States and the 18 OECD countries. However, we cannot reject the null for the 88 PWT
countries. In fact, in the latter case the tted coe¢ cient ̂ is positive and signicant.
As shown in the simulations reported in Appendix D, the log t test may not perform well
in terms of the accuracy of its nominal size when there are a large number of heterogeneous
cross sectional units, as in the case of the 88 PWT nations. In particular, the test shows
a tendency to overreject in such situations. We therefore perform additional tests using the
subsampling approach described in section 5.4 to improve size and provide more information
about transitioning to convergence. In the rst step, we create 4 subgroups based on a panel
ordering with respect to last period income, with subgroup A having the highest last period
income, subgroup B the next highest, and so on. Table 2 shows the results of these tests. For
each subgroup (A through D), the null hypothesis of no convergence is rejected at the 5% level.
Importantly, this rejection of the null does not mean that all countries in the 88 PWT panel
are converging over the sample period, but it does imply evidence of subgroup convergence.
Next, we proceed with the second step test, forming three subgroups from the original
groupings. Subgroup E comprises the lower 11 income countries from original subgroup A and
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the higher 11 income countries from original subgroup B. Similar constructions apply to give
new subgroups F and G. The outcome of the log t test applied to these new subgroups can
be interpreted in the following way. In view of the overlapping nature of the data (relative to
the original subgroups), rejection of the null hypothesis of no convergence for a new subgroup
provides evidence in favor of catch-up growth performance between the original subgroups.
In e¤ect, the top income countries in the lower group are catching up with the lower income
countries in the upper group. As seen in the nal panel of Table 2, the log t test rejects the null
decisively for each of the subgroups E, F and G. The rejection of the null for subgroup E (which
comprises countries from both subgroup A and subgroup B) therefore suggests convergence
amongst these countries, so that the upper income countries in subgroup B are catching up
with subgroup A. The same conclusion holds for subgroups G and H. This nding supports
the catch-up hypothesis across the original subgroups and thereby indicates some evidence in
favor of these countries being on a transitional path towards ultimate convergence, akin to
that of the long run historical trajectory of the OECD countries over the past ve centuries.
Table 2: Empirical Evidence for Transitional Divergence
Regression: logHGt = logA  2 log t+ uGt
Cases Sample Period ̂ t ratio
log t Test within a panel
48 United States 1929-1998 1.174 94.4
18 OECD 1870-2001 0.643 5.29
88 PWT 1960-1996 -0.200 -22.49
Sub group log t Test for 88 PWT : Step 1
Sub A: 22 Highest 1960-1996 1.318 16.36
Sub B: 22 High 1960-1996 0.822 36.52
Sub C: 22 Poor 1960-1996 1.041 11.22
Sub D: 22 Poorest 1960-1996 0.136 2.85
Sub group log t Test for 88 PWT : Step 2
Sub E: 22 countries linking A and B 1960-1996 0.882 15.01
Sub G: 22 countries linking B and C 1960-1996 1.126 14.60
Sub H: 22 countries linking C and D 1960-1996 0.316 9.31
The same regression tests (both all-group and subgroup tests) were run with the 127 country
OECD historical data covering the longer time period 1950-2001. These regressions gave very
similar results to those reported in Table 2 for the PWT data, so they are not repeated here.
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Figure 15: Four subgroups and convergence within each group. (88 PWT countries, NG = 22;
G=4)
6.3 Transitioning in Sample Variation
Fig. 15 shows the time path of the sample variance HGt for 4 subgroups of the 88 PWT
countries, so that NG = 22: The groups are arranged in descending order of income with group
1 having the highest income countries and group 4 those with the lowest income. Evidently,
there is some strong evidence favorable to convergence within each group, although HGt turns
upward for group 4 towards the end of the sample and appears to atten out for group 2. Fig.
16 shows HGt for 3 mixed subgroups obtained by taking the intermediate country groupings
after discarding the 11 highest income countries and the 11 poorest countries. For each of
these new subgroups, the total number of countries included is again 22. Apparently, there is
evidence of transitioning to convergence within each group. The results imply that group 4
is catching up with group 3, which in turn is catching up with group 2, and so on. In other
words, overall there is some evidence of a transitioning towards long run convergence among
the 88 PWT countries. This is so, even though a full-group test rejects convergence, indicating
that the process of transition is more complex than what can be captured in a single test.
7 Conclusion
As authors such as Durlauf and Quah (1999) have noted, the study of cross country economic
growth often reveals more about heterogeneity in economic performance than it does about
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Figure 16: The second subgrouping. Group 1+2 consist of 11 low income in group 1 and 11
high income in group 2, and so on.
convergence. Indeed, just as the distribution of income within nations displays inequality that
evolves over time, the distribution of income across nations moves over time, often in ways that
cannot be anticipated. Nonetheless, it is also evident that the benets of modern technology
are spreading across national borders and inuencing economic performance. Of course, this
di¤usion occurs more quickly in some cases and for some countries than it does for others.
Thus, while there are good reasons to expect some convergence in economic performance,
especially with the growth of regional economic unions, there are also reasons to expect that
the paths of transition in economic performance may be very di¤erent across nations. Indeed,
in the process of observing nations over time, we observe many di¤erent forms of transitional
behavior. Some groups of countries or economic regions behave in a similar way over time
and appear to moving on a path towards some steady state growth pattern. Others appear to
diverge over certain periods of time, fall behind and then turn around and show evidence of
catching up.
This paper seeks to provide some mechanisms for thinking about such transitions, modeling
them in a manner that is compatible with a neoclassical framework, and measuring them
econometrically. To do so, we focus not on economic growth but on economic growth relative
to the average performance in a subgroup of economies or an individual benchmark like that of
the US economy. This process enables us to identify the relative transitions that occur within
these subgroups and to measure these transitions against the correlative of a common growth
trend. Thus, in measuring a countrys economic transition curve, we are able to assess its path
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over time relative to a useful benchmark. In this approach, the transition curve of an economy
is an individual characteristic, allowing for many ways in which a neoclassical steady state can
be approached, but also including the possibility of transitional divergence from that state.
The reality of economic transition raises questions about the relevant factors that inuence
transition. Just as a host of variables have been considered in analyzing the determinants
of growth (Barro, 1997; Sala-i-Martin, 1997), there are similarly a large number of factors
potentially inuencing transition. These factors range over the many economic, social, cultural
and political facets that characterise individual countries. In other work (Phillips and Sul,
2005), the authors are using the methods of this paper to explore the manner in which such
factors may inuence economic transition. Just as there is transition in economic growth
performance over time, we may also expect transition behavior (relative to some benchmark)
in many of the factors that inuence growth, such as human capital and educational attainment.
Linkages between these two forms of transitional behavior contribute to our undertanding of
the time-forms of long run economic performance and the various transitions that individual
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Technical Appendix
Appendix A: Standardizing the Growth Components
This Appendix provides an analysis of how the growth components in (11), i.e., the elements
in the decomposition






may be standardized to yield the transition and growth curves. We let t!1 and characterize
the limiting behavior of the components bit and t:
We rst proceed as if the growth components were nonstochastic. Suppose xitt = fi (t) is
regularly varying at innity with power exponent i (e.g. Seneta, 1976) so that
fi (t) = t
iWi (t) ; (30)
where Wi (t) is slowly varying at innity, viz. Wi (t) =Wi (t) ! 1 as t ! 1 for all  > 0:
Similarly, let t be regularly varying at innity with power exponent  > 0 so that
t = t
Z (t) (31)
for some slowly varying function Z (t) : The regular variation requirement means that fi (t)
and t both behave asymptotically like power functions for large t: In the simplest case where
the common growth component is a linear drift (i.e., t = t) and xit ! x for all i as t ! 1;
there is growth convergence and we have i =  = 1 and Wi (t) = Z (t) = 1: Conditions (30)
and (31) allow for a much wider variety of asymptotic behavior, including the possibility that
individual i economys growth may deviate from the common path (when i 6= ):
Set t = [Tr] for some r > 0 representing the fraction of the overall sample T corresponding











Z (T )  rZ (T ) :
We deduce from this asymptotic behavior and (11) that









 riWi (T ) ;
T t  rZ (T ) =  (r)Z (T ) :
where  (r) = r :
39







































where Ji (T ) = Wi (T ) =Z (T ) is slowly varying at innity. Thus, the functions bJiT (r) and
ZT (r) are regularly varying and behave asympotically like the power functions r
i  and r ;
at least up to slowly varying factors.
Next set diT = T iJi (T )Z (T ) = T iWi (T ) ; so that the slowly varying components are













T iWi (T )
+
xitt
T iWi (T )




T Z (T )

= o (1) +

xitt
T iWi (T )




T Z (T )












 biT (r)T (r) : (34)


















 Z   tT T 
Z (T )
; (35)
















Then, for t = [Tr] we have
biT (r)! bi (r) = ri  ; (37)
and
T (r)!  (r) = r : (38)
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Relations (34) to (38) lead to a nonstochastic version of the stated result (18). For a stochastic
version, we may continue to assume that the standardized representation (34) applies with an
op (1) error uniformly in t  T and require that
biT (r) ! p bi (r) = ri  ;
T (r) ! p  (r) = r ;
uniformly in r 2 [0; 1] ; so that the limit transition function bi (r) and growth curve  (r) are
non random functions.
More generally, the limit functions bi (r) and  (r) may themselves be stochastic processes.
For example, if the common growth component t in log yit is a unit root stochastic trend,
then by standard functional limit theory on a suitably dened probability space
T 1=2[Tr] = T (r)!p B (r) ; (39)
for some Brownian motion B (r) : In place of (30), suppose that fi (t) = xitt=t is stochastically
regularly varying at innity in the sense that fi (t) continues to follow (30) for some power
exponent i but with Wi (t) stochastically slowly varying at innity, i.e., Wi (t) =Wi (t)!p 1










Wi (T )  riWi (T ) :
Then, setting diT = T i+1=2Wi (T ) ; t = [Tr] and working in the same probability space where
(39) holds, we have
d 1iT log yit =
ait











= op (1) + biT (r)T (r)!p bi (r)B (r) ;
with bi (r) = ri : In this case the limiting common trend function is the stochastic process
 (r) = B (r) and the transition function is the non random function bi (r) = ri :
Appendix B: Transition Curve Regression and Convergence Testing
A general theory for the calculation of asymptotic standard errors of tted curves of the
type ĥi (r) that allow for deterministic and stochastic trend components of unknown form is
presently not available in the literature and is beyond the scope of the present paper. Instead,
we will conne ourselves to the important special case where the trend function involves a
stochastic trend with linear drift and we focus attention in this Appendix on the development
of a test of subgroup convergence.
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We start by considering a model in which the common trend component t has the form
of a stochastic trend with drift. More specically, let t = at +
Pt
j=0 "j for some constant
a > 0 and where "t is a zero mean weakly dependent sequence for which the functional law
T 1=2
P[Tr]
j=0 "j ) B" (r) holds as T ! 1; where B is Brownian motion with variance !2"; the
long run variance of "t: We further suppose that (15) holds with the common standardization
dT = T so that



















and that bit = bi + b0it !p bi as t ! 1 for some constants bi > 0: In what follows, we assume
that the b0it are independent across i and may be written in the form b
0
it = tit; where t ! 0
as t!1 and it is a zero mean, variance unity, weakly dependent time series for each i: The










jt ) Bj (r) ; (41)




: Primitive conditions under
which (41) holds are quite general and may be derived in terms of linear process models as in
Phillips and Solo (1992). Clearly, !2j depends on fourth moments of the original sequence jt:
The variates jt; like jt; are independent across j, so that the limit Brownian motions Bj are
also independent across j.










so that both T and NG pass to innity and T = o (NG) :
According to this formulation, in the long run as t ! 1; economy i shares in common
growth t up to the proportionality factor bi (c.f. (45) below). Since t ! 0 as t ! 1;
the component b0it = tit in bit decays in importance as t increases. In what follows, it is




; for some b;   0; (42)
which is a form of evaporating trend or decay model (when  > 0) of the type studied in Phillips
(2000). As shown below, this parametric form is helpful in the development of convergence
tests and a suitable limit theory that can be used in practical work.
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Proceeding with this set up, we have the explicit standardized form


































so that for t = [Tr] with r > 0


















! p abir; (45)
giving economy is share in the common growth limit function ar: Note that (45) becomes abr
under the hypothesis of growth convergence, where bi = b for all i and  > 0:








j2G jt and ~qit = it  
N 1G
P





































































































It follows that for large t and NG we have
hGit   1 =






































bi   bG and t are retained in the error term because the error magnitude in (46)
is inuenced by whether there is group homogeneity in the bi; in which case bi   bG = 0; and
by the value of  in the decay model (42) for t:






























































































































































































































































































since 2G = 1:
Taking logarithms of (49) gives





































giving equation (29) in the text.
As indicated in the text, we may test the null hypothesis H0 :  = 0 against the alternative
H1 :  > 0 by means of a least squares regression of (50) using observations t = [Tr] ; [Tr] +
1; :::; T for some r > 0: The alternative H1 therefore corresponds to the case of subgroup G
growth convergence under the maintained hypothesis bj = b for all j 2 G: We now proceed to
develop the limit theory for this regression.
Write (50) as
zt = f + d log t+ u
G






where fT = f + d log T = logA  2 log T: Dene


























































































































































































































































by standard weak convergence arguments: The Brownian motions Bj (r) are independent across
j in view of the independence of the jt: Note that the limit (57) is well dened for all r 2 [0; 1):
Using independence across j and applying sequential limits in which T ! 1; followed by





















































































Using the methods of Phillips and Moon (1999) and some additional regularity conditions, this
result can presumably be extended to hold under joint limiting arguments where T and NG
may pass to innity jointly.
Using the original parameterization of (50), we have d =  2 and it follows from (59) thatp
TNG (̂  )) N (0; V (r)) ; (60)












is graphed as a function of r in Fig. 17 for !2G=4 = 1: V (r) increases monotonically with r and
is unbounded as r ! 1 because in that event the regression uses less than O (T ) time series
observations and the rate of convergence is correspondingly slower than
p
TNG.
Inference can be conducted using (60), the expression (61) and an estimate of !2G; which
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Figure 17: Limiting Variance V (r) of
p
T (̂  ) for !2" = 1






































































































as NG ! 1: It follows that NG times the long run variance of uGt is a consistent estimate of
!2G: Hence, !
2
G may be consistently estimated by computing a conventional long run variance
estimate !̂2
ûGt
from the residuals, ûGt ; of the regression (50) and scaling this estimate by NG;




Thus, to test the null hypothesis H0 :  = 0 of no convergence we t the regression model
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(1  r)2   r log2 r
o :
We reject H0 in favor of H1 :  > 0 for a one-sided signicant statistic tGr:
The power of this test can be derived using (55). From this equation, we have
p









































































































t=1 jt ) Bj (r) ; for some Brownian motion Bj and where the integral in (64)
is nite for all r > 0 and  > 0: We deduce from (63) that for all  > 0p

























































and the test is consistent. Some further calculations reveal that the test is powerful against
local alternatives of the form  = cp
TNg





















so that (56) continues to hold, as in the null  = 0 case. It follows that the localizing sequence
 = cp
TNg


















which gives the local asymptotic power function of the log t test.
Appendix C: Transitioning and Subsample Convergence Testing
We propose the following two-step approach to subsample testing of transitioning to conver-
gence, where members of one economic subgroup catch up to members of a higher income
subgroup.
Step 1 For each group G 2 G; run the log t regression and obtain the t-ratio, tG; of the
coe¢ cient of log t: Under the null hypothesis of no convergence, as T ! 1; all the tG
statistics have a limiting standard normal distribution as derived in Appendix B. For
nite T; the distribution of the tG will be much more complex. Take the maximum value
of the statistic across groups, viz. tMAXG = maxG2G tG:Under the null hypothesis of no
convergence (that is the full-group of economies do not converge), then we will accept
H0 if tMAXG exceeds the left tail critical value (e.g. t
MAX
G >  1:65 in the case of a 5%
test). In this event, some groups may have regression coe¢ cients in log t regression
ln2Gt = aG + bG ln t+ Gt for t = t0; :::; T and G 2 G = N=NG: (65)
that are signicantly negative by the usual criterion but others are not signicant. We
therefore acceptthe null of no convergence over the full set of economies in this case.
Simulations indicate that in nite samples the probability of rejecting the null of no
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in the nominal 5% case, is often too
large, giving upwards size distortion or distortion towards acceptance of convergence. In
view of this bias towards rejection of the null, we suggest a second step to reduce the
size distortion, which is based on a subsampling - search procedure to see if there is more
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis.
Step 2 If tMAXG <  1:65 in step 1, form new subgroups (overlapping the original subgroups)
by eliminating ` = NG=2 economies from the highest income group and adding ` countries
from the second highest income group to form a new subgroup with the same number
of economies as before. Repeat this procedure with the remaining economies to form
G   1 new subgroups in total. With this new collection of economies, repeat Step 1. We
reject H0 only when the evidence is convincing that across all these subgroups there is
rejection of the null. This subsampling modication sets a higher hurdle for rejection of
the null or acceptance of convergence and thereby helps to control size distortion. As
discussed in the body of the paper, this second step test also provides information about
transitional e¤ects between the original subgroups.
Appendix D: Some Simulations of Transition and Convergence
As is apparent from the above discussion, many di¤erent data generating mechanisms are
compatible with the transition and growth curve formulations. These include models where
there is growth convergence as well as models where there is growth divergence and various
forms of transitional divergence combined with ultimate convergence. This section provides
some brief simulation evidence based on panel data generating processes (dgps) that include
some of these possibilities. These specic models also allow us to develop an asymptotic theory
for the log t regression discussed in the last section and to evaluate the statistical performance
of the proposed methods in nite samples of panel data.
We consider the following two panel dgps. The rst involves a nonlinear panel specication
which allows for convergence and divergence, while the second dgp is a simple panel of unit
root processes with drift.
DGP 1: Nonlinear Panel Model with Common Growth
The following model is a nonlinear panel growth model with factor structure that involves a
common trend component t (comprising a random walk with drift) and a loading parameter
(bit) that is time varying and whose variance (2t ) may be subject to decay over time depending
on whether the convergence parameter  > 0: Convergence occurs when bi = bj for all i 6= j
and  > 0: The model has the form
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ln yit = bitt; t = a+ t 1 + et















i  U [0:5; 0:95] ; et  N (0; 1) ; a = 0:04:




with !b 2 (0:1; 0:2; 0:3)
while under the alternative of convergence bi = 1 for all i and  > 0:With HP ltered data, we
found a range of empirical values for b around 0.05 along with various values of !b under the
null hypothesis of no convergence. Four di¤erent speeds of convergence are considered by tak-
ing  2 f1; 0:5; 0:3; 0:0g : As  decreases, ultimate convergence takes longer, thereby allowing
for the possibility of transitionally divergent behavior for nite T . By contrast, as  increases,
some evidence of transitionally convergent behavior is possible for nite T even under the null
of no convergence where bi 6= bj for i 6= j: Hence as  increases (decreases), this leads us to
expect that there may be some upwards size distortion in the log t test for this model under
the null of no convergence. When  = 0 but bi = 1; then ln yit does not converge since the
error variance 2t does not tend to zero.
DGP 2: Panel Random Walks with Drift
The following model is a panel of unit root processes driven by autoregressions with some
panel cross section dependence structure delivered by a simple factor model with common
shocks t over time and idiosyncratic loadings i for each economy.
ln yit = ai + ln yit 1 + uit
uit = iuit 1 + it
it = it + eit
The parameters for this dgp are set by taking estimates from empirical growth regressions with
88 PWT countries. From these estimates we calculate an empirically plausible range of values
for the parameters and then draw the parameter settings randomly from uniform distributions
set with these limits. Accordingly, we set ai  iid U (0:001; 0:061) ; i  iid U (1; 4) ; t 




with ei  iid U (0:00; 0:064) : With HP
ltered data, we found a range of empirical values for i in the interval (0:94; 1:05) ; while with
the raw data we found values of i in the much wider interval ( 0:50; 0:65) ; in both cases
making no adjustments for small sample autoregressive bias. Accordingly, for the simulations
we excluded negative i values and considered the following four cases: Case I: i 2 (0; 0:1) ;
Case II: i 2 (0; 0:3) ; Case III: i 2 (0; 0:5) ; Case IV: i 2 (0; 0:7) and Case V: i 2 (0; 0:9) :
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Results
The results are reported in Appendix Tables A1 and A2, which show performance for both
dgps and both the all-group log t test and the sequential subgroup tests outlined above.
We consider the results for DGP 1 rst. Here, the log t test applied to all countries in a
single group shows size distortion, with actual size in the range (0:33; 0:62) for a nominal 5%
test. However, in the case where  = 0 and bi = 1; for which the test is specically designed,
actual size is much better and is 0.12 for the all-group test. The sequential subgroup tests are
conservatively sized without showing any serious lowering of power (only in the case  = 0:3
does power drop below unity).
Under DGP 2, the actual size of the test is lower in cases where there are more large i in
the panel. In such (near unit root) cases, we can reasonably expect the divergence behavior
to be more marked in the panel, so that there is less size distortion in consequence. Note that
under DGP 2, as equation (75) shows, when there are large numbers of economies HGt may
appear to decrease over time (although not to zero), and this reduction results in some size
distortion in the test. Again, the subgroup tests help to reduce this size distortion.
Table A1: Rejection Rate for DGP 1: Nonlinear Panel Specication.
(Nominal 5% Test), N=88, T=36. First 6 observations discarded (r = 1=6).
!b  = 0:5  = 0:3
Step 1 Step 2 log t Step 1 Step 2 log t
0.0 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.924 0.903 1.000
0.1 0.331 0.276 0.623 0.333 0.281 0.592
0.2 0.115 0.040 0.438 0.112 0.055 0.400
0.3 0.048 0.004 0.367 0.052 0.009 0.332
 = 0; !b = 0
Step1 Step2 log t
0.006 0.003 0.124
Table A2: Rejection Rate for DGP 2: Random Walks with Drift.
(Nominal 5% Test), N=88, T=36. First 6 observations discarded (r = 1=6).
Case Step1 Step2 log t
1 0.238 0.155 0.373
2 0.240 0.152 0.370
3 0.220 0.134 0.337
4 0.188 0.098 0.282
5 0.171 0.077 0.313
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Appendix E: Limit Behavior of the Transition Parameter under Divergence
The ultimate requirement for convergence in a neoclassical framework that allows for transition
is that xit ! x: Then, log per capita real income follows a linear trend (stationary process) in
the steady state. During transition, however, the behavior could be stochastically nonstation-
ary depending on the manner in which xit and it evolve over time. For instance, xit might
follow a martingale that converged almost surely to a constant value x:
There are even more ways of characterizing divergent behavior. A simple mechanism that
ts in with research by Bernard and Durlauf (1995, 1996) is to allow for log per capita real
income to follow individual random walks with drift, as in
log yit = it; it = ci + it 1 + "it; (66)
where ci is an idiosyncratic drift parameter and the shocks "it are zero mean, stationary and
ergodic time series with nite variance 2" over t: The "it may well be correlated across i
provided the unit root processes have full rank N and there is no cointegration between it
and jt for i 6= j. Each log yit has stochastic trend behavior and and there is growth divergence
between log yit and log yjt for all i 6= j. As in (11, we can write (66) in the form12















t = bitt; (67)
where ai involves initial conditions, which we take to be Op (1) for all i; where t = t is the
common trend growth, and where








"is !a:s: ci as t!1; (68)
by ergodicity. For any economies i and j with ci 6= cj ; log yit   log yjt is clearly divergent as
t!1; even though there may be subperiods of time when their growth paths may be close for
instance, if the partial sum process
Pt
s=1 ("is   "js) crosses the trend line (ci   cj) t+(ai   aj) :
In such a case, log yit and log yjt might seem to converge as the economies evolve towards such
a crossing time but they will diverge subsequently.












12We can also standardize log yit and write (67) in the form


































in a format analogous to (15).
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Then, with N xed, we have hitN = bit= 1N
PN
j=1 bjt !a:s: ci=cN as t ! 1; and, setting
HtN = N
 1PN
i=1 (hitN   1)













= dN > 0:
The nonzero limit dN represents the heterogeneity in the coe¢ cients ci which, in turn, reects
heterogeneity in the fundamental parameters it and xit:
Next, we consider the properties of hitN for xed (large) t and asymptotically large N;
corresponding to a full population of economies. We allow "is to be cross sectionally correlated
but it is useful to require laws of large numbers to apply as N ! 1 in order to study limit
behavior. In particular, we require that the moments cN ; c2N have nite limits, viz.,
cN ! c; c2N ! c2 as N !1; (69)




















"is"is+h !a:s:  (h) (70)














































[1 + o (1)] ;
as t ! 1: Primitive conditions under which sequential limits such as (70) - (71) hold are


































(hitN   1)2 ! a:s:








We may use the last property to compare the sample mean squared error, 2tN , of hitN for






c2   c2 + !2T2 c
2
c2   c2 + !2T1 c
2
< 1; for T2 > T1; (75)
suggesting that for large N the sample mean squared error HtN may appear to decrease as t
increases, but not to zero, when there is growth divergence.
Data Appendix
Three panel data sets of log per capita real income are used in the paper. The rst panel (A)
relates to the 48 contiguous United States from 1929 to 1998 (Source: Bureau of Economic
Analysis). The second panel (B) consists of 127 countries from 1950 to 2001. (Source: OECD
The World economy: historical statistics). From the same OECD data source we also collected
the long historical data set for 18 Western OECD countries covering the period from 1500 to
2001. The third panel (C) includes 88 countries (Source: PWT 6.1). The remaining three
subsections of this Appendix show how subgroups for these panels were created based on
regional location and geographical distance.
Panel Data Set A: Regional US State Classications
Mid-Altantic: Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
Great Lakes: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin
Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming
Pacic: California, Oregon, Washington
Plain States: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakoda, South Dakoda
South Atlantic: Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia
West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas
East South Central: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennesse
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Panel Data Set B: OECD The world economy historical statistics.
We form the following subgroups based on geographical location and population.


















18 Western OECD Countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerand, United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, United States
8 Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela
15 Carribean Countries: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Haïti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Puerto Rico, Trinidad
and Tobago
China, India, Japan
3 Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs): Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia
11 Eastern Asian Countries: Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan,
Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Philippines, Vietnam
4 Asian Dragons: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan
12 Middle East: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, South Arabia, Syria,
Turkey, Yemen, Palestine and Gaza,
50 African Countries: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoro Islands, Congo, Côte dIvoire, Djibouti, Egypt,
Eritrea and Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea, Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion,
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo,
Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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127 World Economies: Includes all countries in the above 11 subgroups plus Albania,
Greece and Ireland.
Panel Data Set C: 88 PWT Version 6.1 Countries
We form the following subgroups, again based on geographical location and population.




















7 Middle East and North African Countries: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel,
Jordan, Syria
20 Sub-Saharan Africa Countries: Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Rep.,
Congo (D.R.), Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sene-
gal, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
22 Latin American and Carribean Countries: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad &Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela
India, China,
7 Eastern Asian Countries: Bangladesh, Fiji, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philip-
pines, Sri Lanka
18 OECD Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
USA
4 Dragons: Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan
58
3 NICs: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand
88 World Economies: The dataset includes all countries in the above 7 subgroups plus Roma-
nia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland and Turkey.
5 Subgroups in Figure 1 (Initial Income Ordering)
The country ordering is based on initial income in year 1960. Malawi was the poorest country, while
Swizterland was the richest in 1960.
Subgroup 1 (Poorest): Malawi, Uganda, Pakistan, China, Lesotho, Nepal, Rwanda, India,
Indonesia, Ghana, Gambia, Botswana, Mali, Congo, Dem. Rep., Togo, Romania, Benin
Subgroup 2 (Poor): Bangladesh, Thailand, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, South
Korea, Egypt, Syria, Cameroon, Honduras, Dominican Rep., Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Ecuador,
Guyana
Subgroup 3 (Middle Income): Philippines, Malaysia, Central African Rep., Guatemala,
Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia, Algeria, Jordan, Singapore, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Colombia, Fiji,
Iran, Turkey, Jamaica
Subgroup 4 (Rich): Hong Kong, Cyprus, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Peru, El Salvador,
Portugal, Mauritius, Chile, Mexico, Greece, Trinidad &Tobago, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Ireland
Subgroup 5 (Richest): Israel, Uruguay, Italy, Argentina, Austria, Finland, Belgium, France,
Iceland, Norway, Venezuela, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, Australia, Denmark, New
Zealand, USA, Switzerland
4 Subgroups in Log t tests (Last Income Ordering)
The ordering for the countries is based on the nal income year 1996. Congo (D.R.) was the poorest
country in 1996, while the U.S.A. was the richest in 1996.
Subgroup 1: Congo (D.R), Malawi, Mali, Uganda, Rwanda, Niger, Mozambique, Zambia,
Togo, Central African Rep., Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Nepal, Lesotho, Senegal, Bangladesh, Nicaragua,
Cameroon, Pakistan, India, Honduras
Subgroup 2: Guyana, Bolivia, Zimbabwe, China, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea,
Jordan, Dominican Rep., Guatemala, Syria, Egypt, Indonesia, Ecuador, Jamaica, El Salvador, Peru,
Iran, Algeria, Romania, Costa Rica, Fiji
Subgroup 3: Paraguay, Colombia, Panama, Turkey, Botswana, Brazil, Venezuela, Thailand,
South Africa, Mexico, Chile, Malaysia, Uruguay, Trinidad &Tobago, Argentina, Mauritius, Greece,
Portugal, South Korea, Barbados, Spain, Taiwan
Subgroup 4: Israel, Cyprus, New Zealand, Ireland, Finland, United Kingdom, France, Italy,
Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, Iceland, Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Singapore, Norway,
Japan, Switzerland, Hong Kong, USA.
59
